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Abstract
This paper develops a simple search model in which sector-specic trainings are
endogenously determined with or without a negotiation between a worker and an
employer, and characterizes the allocation of two types of training. If a worker
and an employer can negotiate over the amount of skill training, the training hours
to acquire a skill specic to this employers sector may be longer or shorter in
the decentralized allocation than in the socially e¢ cient allocation. Meanwhile, if
they cannot negotiate, the training hours are denitely longer in the decentralized
allocation than in the socially e¢ cient allocation.
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1. Introduction
The e¢ ciency property of human capital investment has provoked a great deal of con-
troversy. In search theory, it is well known that a workers training e¤ort to acquire
a single-dimensional skill (general skill) is lower than what it would be in the socially
e¢ cient level1. To the best of our knowledge, the e¢ ciency property of the investment
to acquire multi-dimensional skills2 has not been adequately discussed so far. Thus, in
order to ll this gap, this paper constructs a search model with multi-dimensional skills
and focuses on the e¢ ciency of the allocation of (exogenous) training hours to acquire
each skill.
In this model, there are two sectors, and each job in a sector requires a sector-specic
skill for production. A newborn worker is initially assigned to a sector (which is called an
initial sector) and conducts skill training to acquire necessary skills by spending exogenous
training hours. More precisely, workers decide to allocate exogenous training hours in
order to acquire these skills at birth. In the market equilibrium, workers acquire the
skills of not only the initial sector but also another one, because if a worker allocates too
many hours to acquire a skill specic to the initial sector, she/he produces only a small
amount of output in her/his job when switching to another sector.
Previous papers have discussed the importance of considering the e¢ ciency of skill
investment in an environment where a worker and her/his employer can negotiate over the
investment to acquire skills3. In response to these discussions, I analyze the following two
cases: The rst case is that a worker and her/his employer can negotiate the allocation
of training hours, and the second case is that they cannot negotiate.
There are potentially two sources of ine¢ ciency, and these sources have opposing
e¤ects on the allocation of training hours. The rst source is the hold-up problem, which
is due to a lack of complete contingent contracts of wages, which leads to over investment
in training to acquire a skill of an initial sector. The second source is the outside option
e¤ect, by which workers determine the allocation to improve their outside option in wage
bargaining, which leads to under investment in training to this skill. If an employed
worker and her/his employer can negotiate the allocation of training hours, both sources
arise, and the worker may allocate more or less hours to acquire the skill of an initial
sector than what would be socially e¢ cient. Meanwhile, if they can negotiate, only the
hold-up problem arises, and then, the allocation of training hours for this skill must be
more than what would be socially e¢ cient.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework.
Section 3 characterizes the socially e¢ cient allocation. Section 4 denes the allocation
1See Acemoglu (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), and Masters (forthcoming).
2In recent years, Wasmer (2008) and Mukoyama and Sahin (2009) examined the skill investment
problem with multi-dimensional skills with search friction. However, they did not analyze the e¢ ciency
property.
3See, for example, the survey by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).
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characterized in market equilibrium, and section 5 concludes.
2. Environment
I consider a partial equilibrium and discrete-time model, and the measure of each period
is one. Workers exit from the labor market with probability  (death shock), and the
same number of newborn workers enter the labor market in each period. The number of
workers in the steady state is then a constant and normalized unity. There are two sectors,
A and B, and two types of sector-specic skills, hA and hB, where hj2fA;Bg indicates the
amount of a sector j specic skill. To simplify, an employed worker exogenously moves
to unemployment with probability s (job destruction shock), and an unemployed worker
meets a vacant job in sector j with exogenous probability pj 2 [0; 1] (and pA + pB  1).
Note that I assume that workers and rms do not discount the future utility and prots
due to the death rate.
An employed worker with a skill vector h = [hA; hB] produces yj(h) = y (hj) in a
sector j 2 fA;Bg, where y0j > 0 and yj(0) = 0. To guarantee an inner solution, yj
satises the following properties; y00j < 0, y
0
j(0) = 1, y0j(1) = 0, and y00j is small enough.
Moreover, I consider the equilibrium in which all workers acquire both hA and hB and
accept a job in both sectors.
Without loss of generality, I assume that newborn workers do not have any skills and
are exogenously allocated to a job in sector A (called an initial job). They conduct skill
training to acquire skills before starting to produce in the initial job. Note that workers
cannot conduct additional skill training after their training period, in order to focus on
the allocation problem of training hours. The number of training hours to acquire hj
is hj, where  is the parameter indicating the e¤ectiveness of skill training, and the
training hours constraints that are then faced by newborn workers are 1  Pj hj.
Moreover, they must decide the allocation of training hours for hA and hB:
Timing in each period is as follows: (i) Newborn workers decide the allocation of
training hours for hA and hB, (ii) employed workers produce outputs and conduct wage
bargaining, (iii) the labor market is open, and (iv) job destruction and death shocks
occur.
Flow conditions
Let ej and u denote the number of employed workers in sector j and the number of
unemployed workers respectively. The steady state condition of eA is
 + (1  ) pAu = [1  (1  ) (1  s)] eA: (1)
The LHS of equation (1) shows inows into eA. The rst term represents the number of
newborn workers, and the second term, the number of workers who meet a job in sector
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A. The RHS indicates outows from eA, the number of workers who lose their own jobs
or die.
Similarly, the steady state condition of eB is
(1  ) pBu = [1  (1  ) (1  s)] eB. (2)
Because u = 1  eA   eB, equations (1) and (2) show the ratio of eB to eA:
eB
eA
=
(1  )2 spB
(1  )2 spA +  [1  (1  ) (1  s) + (1  ) (pA + pB)]
: (3)
Equation (3) implies that eA > eB if pA = pB, because newborn workers are initially
allocated to jobs in sector A.
3. The social planners problem
First, I characterize a solution of the social planners problem. A social planner deter-
mines the allocation of training hours to maximize social surplus, within the training
hours constraint. The social planners problem is dened by
max
hA;hA
X
j2fA;Bg
yj(h)ej s.t. 1 = 
X
j
hj:
The rst order conditions are given by y0 (hj) ej = , where  is the Lagrangian
multiplier. Substituting the rst order condition into equation (3) yields
y0A(hA)
y0B (hB)
=
(1  )2 spB
(1  )2 spA +  [1  (1  ) (1  s) + (1  ) (pA + pB)]
: (4)
Given that y00j < 0, if pA = pB, then hA > hB, because in the steady state, workers are
more likely to work in sector A than in sector B.
4. Market equilibrium
This section solves the problem of market equilibrium. To do so, I rst dene the following
value functions. According to Pissarides (2000), the value of unemployment is, U (h) =
(1  )
hP
j pjWj (h) +

1 Pj pjU(h)i and the value of a vacant job is dened as
zero4 without loss of generality. The value of employment in sector j is Wj(h) = wj (h)+
(1  ) [sU(h) + (1  s)Wj(h)], where wj(h) is wages, and the value of having a job lled
is Jj(h) = yj(h)  wj (h) + (1  ) (1  s)Jj (h).
4The results of this paper hold even when the value of the vacant job is positive.
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The wage is determined through the basic Nash bargaining, and the rst order con-
dition of Nash bargaining yields Wj (h)  U (h) = b(Wj (h) + Jj (h)  U (h)), where b is
the parameter indicating the workers bargaining power. U (h) can then be rewritten as
U (h) =
(1  ) bPj pjyj (h)
1  (1  ) (1    pb) : (5)
Because y00 < 0 and 1  Pj hj, if pAy0(hA) < pBy0 (yB), U (h) increases with training
hours to acquire hB and decreases with training hours to acquire hA.
Finally, I characterize the equilibrium allocation of the two types of training in the
following two cases: (i) a non-negotiation case in which a worker decides the allocation of
training hours to maximize her/his expected lifetime utility, and (ii) a negotiation case
in which the Coase theorem holds for the allocation of training hours.
4.1 Skill training: The non-negotiation case
In this case, a newborn worker determines her/his allocation of training hours to maximize
WA (h). Then, using the rst order condition of Nash bargaining, I rewrite the workers
problem as follows:
max
hA;hB
b (WA (h) + JA (h)) + (1  b)U (h) s:t: 
X
j2fA;Bg
hj = 1:
The above problem implies that a worker considers the e¤ect on the outside option in
Nash bargaining if b < 1, which is referred to as the outside option e¤ect. Meanwhile, the
social planner does not consider this e¤ect because the level of the outside option only
a¤ects the share of output between a worker and an employer, but not the total output.
Furthermore, when pAy0(hA) < pBy0 (yB) (this really happens in equilibrium), this e¤ect
leads to more training hours to acquire hB than there would be in the socially e¢ cient
allocation:
The rst order condition implies that
b
1  (1  ) (1  s)

@yA(h)
@hj
+ (1  ) s@U(h)
@hj

+ (1  b) @U(h)
@hi
= : (6)
Given that yA (h) = y (hA), this condition implies that the benet gained from an increase
in hB comes through the improvement of U (h). From (5), an increase in b increases this
benet, because the workers share of output determined by Nash bargaining increases.
In other words, the hold-up problem arises, and a worker undervalues an increase in
U (h), thereby leading to underinvestment to acquire hB when pAy0(hA) < pBy0 (yB).
By (6) and (5) ; the equilibrium allocation in this case is
y0(hA)
y0 (hB)
=
(1  (1  ) (1  s)  b) (1  ) pB
(1  ) (1  (1  ) (1  s)  b) pA +  [1  (1  ) (1  s) + (1  ) b (pA + pB)] :
(7)
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Comparing (7) with (4), the equilibrium allocation is the same as the socially e¢ cient
allocation if b = 1. The RHS of (7) is a decreasing function of b. Thus, I can state the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 If 0  b < 1, the market allocation of training hours is ine¢ cient, and
workers allocate excess training hours to acquire hB.
Intuitively, there are two sources of ine¢ ciency in the allocation, the outside option
e¤ect and the hold-up problem. These two sources have opposing e¤ects on the training
allocation. If b < 1, the market allocation is ine¢ cient because both sources arise, and
the outside option e¤ect dominates the hold-up problem.
4.2 Skill training: The negotiation case
Following the Coase theorem, the allocation of training hours is determined to maximize
to the sum of WA (h) and JA (h). The allocation of training hours is then determined by
the solution to the following problem:
max
h
WA (h) + JA (h) ; s.t. 
X
j2fA;Bg
hj = 1:
According to the rst order condition and (5), the optimal condition is
y0(hA)
y0 (hB)
=
b (1  )2 spB
b (1  )2 spA +  [1  (1  ) (1  s) + b (1  ) (pA + pB)]
: (8)
A comparison of (7) and (8) shows that a worker allocates more training hours to
acquire hA through negotiation, because the outside option e¤ect is eliminated. The RHS
of (8) is an increase function of b, and similar to the allocation in the non-negotiation
case, the equilibrium allocation is the same as the socially e¢ cient allocation if b = 1.
Thus, I can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If b < 1, hB is less in the equilibrium allocation than in the socially
optimal allocation.
Intuitively, while the outside option e¤ect is eliminated because of the Coase theorem,
the hold-up problem remains. Then, workers underestimate the benet from improving
outputs in sector B. Moreover, workers allocate all training hours to acquire hA if b = 0,
and the skill training is socially optimal if b = 1 since the hold-up problem is also
eliminated.
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5. Conclusion
This paper investigates the allocation problem of training hours. There are two sources
of ine¢ ciency in this allocation: the rst is that workers consider an e¤ect on the outside
option in the wage bargaining, and the second is the hold-up problem. When newborn
workers are initially assigned to sector A, the rst source induces them to acquire the
sector B specic skill, and the second source discourages them from acquiring this skill.
If a newborn worker and her/his employer can negotiate, only the hold-up problem arises,
and training hours to acquire the sectorA specic skill are longer than the socially optimal
hours. Meanwhile, if they cannot negotiate, the hold-up problem and the outside option
e¤ect occur, and the acquisition level of the sector A specic skill could be either higher
or lower in the decentralized solution than in the socially optimal level.
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